War in Ukraine. Will Russia stop at Ukraine ?

Today, I will tried to bring together all the elements I feel are important for understanding Russia’s trajectory. Its psychology after the collapse of the USSR and its desire for revenge on the West. You’ll also find my estimates for the continuation of the conflict, as well as my arguments. I hope you enjoy reading it.

First, I’ll take a look at the chronology of Russia after the fall of the USSR, to understand what’s at stake for the Russians in the year 2024. This will enable us to understand the psychology of the country and why they act as they do.


I. Timeline of Russia
.

1991

Fall of the USSR.


1994

First Chechen war and difficulty for the Russian army to re-establish its sovereignty over the territory.


1999

Russian tank in front of the presidential palace of Djokhar Doudaiev, first president of Chechnya).

The second Chechen war begins and Vladimir Putin, who comes to power in the meantime, gives Russia a victory. Despite a guerrilla presence until 2009, the Russian victory is overwhelming.


From 1999 to 2004

Vladimir Putin visiting the United States with US President George Bush.

  • A certain understanding between Russia and the West. The West was busy tracking down terrorists in Afghanistan and Iraq following the attacks of September 11, 2001.
  • At the same time, a certain discourse is beginning to emerge in Russia. “Why, in 1991, did we lose our stature as a great power when we lost nothing? No war lost, no capital bombed, no military defeat. WHY?”
    It’s a feeling of frustration and humiliation.

2004

Viktor Louchtchenko.

  • Boosted by their new-found independence, many countries of the former USSR join NATO to guard against a Soviet revival. I’m thinking in particular of the Poles, who were occupied from 1940 to 1991. 6 new countries join NATO, including the Baltic states. It’s yet another blow for Russia and those nostalgic for the USSR, the era of greatness. “Why did we lose?”
  • Also in 2004, the Orange Revolution took place in Ukraine. The pro-Russian government was overthrown by Viktor Yushchenko (known for his scars from an attempted poisoning). This overthrow led to the installation of a pro-European government in place of the previous pro-Russian one.

2008

Russia resumes military interventionism by intervening in the conflict in Georgia, a country aspiring to join NATO.


2010

Viktor Yushchenko, tainted by corruption, is discredited and loses the presidential election. Pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych wins the presidential election.


February 2014

Evenement place Maidan.

Maidan. Massive, violent demonstrations (several dozen dead) lead to the fall of Viktor Yanukovych and his flight to Russia. For the second time, a pro-Russian Ukrainian president is overthrown by the streets. This time, Putin was not about to let it go. This event is a clear sign that Russians want to see Ukraine (or part of it) return to the “motherland”. Russians are concerned by Ukraine’s internal revolutions. It’s as if Germans or Spaniards were voicing opinions on the trade union movements and yellow vests in France.


March 2014

Ukrainian soldier present in Donbass in 2014.

  • Russian or assimilated troops engage in Ukraine’s Donbass region, marking the start of the Donbass War, which will claim 13,000 lives until 2022. Crimea becomes Russian.
  • Russia’s speech already evokes the theme of the stab in the back, suggesting that the fall of the Soviet Union was solely the result of betrayal rather than its own mistakes. This suggests that Russia should, in the medium term, regain its regional power, as if the fall of the USSR were a mere accident of history.
  • Indeed, this rhetoric has been spreading among Russian elites for a decade now. After all, why is the USSR no longer the USSR when it hasn’t been defeated in a war or invaded by a foreign country? (For example, Hitler’s Germany clearly lost the Second World War).
  • What’s more, with the war in the Donbass, it was obvious that Russia and the West, through NATO, would be heading for a confrontation in this region in the years to come.

September 2015

Meeting between Bashar Al-Assad and Vladimir Putin.

  • Russia comes to the aid of Bashar al-Assad, enemy of the West, in Syria. Once again, Russia finds itself on the opposing side of the West. Bashar, on the verge of losing and thus ending the conflict in Syria, finds a strong ally, preventing the war from ending. This is the first Russian intervention outside the USSR since the war in Afghanistan (1979-1989).
  • The refugee crisis persists and continues to pose problems for Europe. Indeed, Europe has divergent responses to the migration crisis. Some countries want to open their borders completely, while others are opposed. These divergences are creating tensions that are detrimental to Europe’s relations with Russia.
  • So, to maintain a migratory crisis, you need migrants. The continuing war in Syria is fuelling this migratory flow.

2021 – Early 2022

In political discourse, the emergence of pretexts to create diplomatic incidents is on the rise. Advertisements highlighting Russia’s military and greatness begin to reappear in Russia.


July 2021

Putin publishes a long article explaining that Ukraine is Russian and should once again become an integral part of Russia.


November 2021

  • An attempted coup against President Zelensky is dismantled. Pro-Russian former Ukrainian president Poroshenko declares that, in the event of conflict between Ukraine and Russia, he would support Russia.
  • Lukashenko, President of Belarus, announces that Belarus would side with Russia in the event of conflict.


December 2021

The Russians concentrate 175,000 troops near the border, claiming that Ukraine must not join NATO. NATO counters by saying that no one tells NATO what to do. Lukashenko acknowledges the annexation of Crimea. Long gone are the days when Lukashenko protested against Russia’s annexation of his country.


February 2022

  • February 17, 2022 : Russia announces a security meeting following the bombing of a school in the Donbass. The die is cast.
  • February 24, 2022 : Russia attacks Ukraine.

March and April 2022

Russian army trucks returning to Ukraine on the morning of February 24, 2022

The West imposes sanctions on Russian companies and suspends trade with Russia.


In conclusion, we can clearly see the sequence of events. It’s difficult to predict with any accuracy the outbreak of the war envisaged ten years ago between Ukraine and Russia, but the more this sequence unfolds, the more tangible the risk of its rapid advent becomes.

So, as early as 2014, it was possible to anticipate these events and prepare accordingly. Western companies then had ten years to withdraw from Ukraine and Russia, ten years to reorient their customer and supplier flows, as well as their markets, and ten years to prepare for the eventuality of a conflict between Russia and NATO.

This is what I propose for China and the West. War could break out, and Western companies in China risk losing their hard-earned assets. There’s still time to withdraw from the country and prepare accordingly.

II. What next ? What will Russia do in Ukraine and Europe ?

In concrete terms, I see two possible scenarios, albeit both leading to the same result: the continuation of hostilities spreading ever further into Europe. I believe that Russia could attack the Baltic States and/or Poland within the next three years, according to two distinct scenarios.

Either, after a period of peace of around 6 to 18 months in Ukraine, Russia rearms and launches its offensive in the Baltic States. Or, in order to further weaken NATO, it decides that to resolve the Ukraine issue, it is necessary to attack Ukraine’s supporters, i.e. NATO. This would extend the conflict into Europe, directly targeting member countries such as the Baltic States and/or Poland.

Why do I think this ?

I formulate this opinion for several reasons. Firstly, I analyze what Russian leaders say about Europe. Secondly, I investigate the Russian economy. Finally, I analyze Russia’s adversaries and allies in Europe.


1/ The Russian discourse.

To begin with, I examined the speeches of Russian politicians and influencers in Russia. Their live TV broadcasts, translated into French, helped me understand the trends. Put simply, Putin is considered a centrist in Russia. Many of his compatriots would like the country to stay away from the West and return to the zone of influence of the USSR. We see Putin as a dangerous figure. For Russians, however, he embodies political centrism.

Proposal from a Russian commentator on live Russian TV.

What I mean by this is that, while the population sees Putin as a centrist, the idea of waging war further west is not seen as aberrant by a large part of the population. Nor is regaining “legitimate Russian” power, which corresponds to the borders of the USSR, seen as extravagant.


2/ Russia’s economy.

The Russian economy is holding its own. Since Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999, Russia has redoubled its efforts to become at least largely independent of the West. This has been particularly evident in the agricultural and industrial sectors. Agricultural production has increased more than threefold since 1999.

Russia has encouraged and modernized its agriculture, resulting in increased yields and production. Undeveloped land remains substantial, and farm expansion continues.

At the same time, industry is also rising from the ashes. GDP is rising, and the oil and defense industries are experiencing strong growth. The extraction of oil, gas and other raw materials enables Russia to generate foreign currency and acquire funds to import what it lacks.

By 2010, oil extraction had returned to Soviet-era levels, having almost halved by 2000.

In the defense sector, following the increase in production rates in recent years, Russia would be able to produce around 2.5 million 155 mm shells. I’ve deliberately chosen the 155 mm shell because it’s the most widely used and a key indicator for the sector. Of course, Russia also produces other ammunition and weapons.

War frees up energies and creates wealth. Armaments and munitions factories sprang up rapidly, creating additional work for building and construction companies. New jobs are also being created in logistics, and many armaments factories are running at full capacity, hiring like crazy. This means that Russian employees can earn a better income, because they are working more, and so on.

What’s more, Russia has forged strong partnerships. I’m thinking in particular of China and North Korea. China allows Russia to export its raw materials and, in exchange, buys everything it needs for war (apart from arms and munitions). However, China exports a lot of dual-use products. Steel, for example, can be used to build tanks or houses. Radios are used in both civilian and military applications. These are the kinds of products that China supplies in large quantities.

What’s more, many countries do not respect the embargoes imposed on Russia and now act as intermediaries between Russia and the West. I’m thinking in particular of the former Soviet republics, the United Arab Emirates and India, whose trade has flourished with both Russia and Europe.

In practical terms, Western sanctions hamper Russia, driving up the cost of its imports while reducing the price of its exports (China being the only country to buy large quantities of hydrocarbons is asking for reductions), but they don’t ground it.

Its partnership with North Korea gives it access to North Korea’s defense industry (which is vast enough to support a war effort). In exchange for food and technology, Russia buys massive quantities of 155 mm shells from North Korea. According to South Korean intelligence, North Korea has already supplied Russia with 2 million shells. It’s easy to see why Russia maintains a production rate of 16,000 shells a day on the Ukrainian front.

Click for graph legend

In blue, imports from the European Union. In red, imports from China. The black curve shows exports to Russia. Clearly, Armenia imports from China and Europe, then sells to Russia.

Meeting between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.


3/ Who’s on the other side ?

The world’s policeman, the United States, has indicated that it will not come to European soil to help the Ukrainians. No ground troops for the USA. The US has never had a culture of mass casualties. This is not a criticism, but it is interesting to note that the military losses suffered by the Americans during their overseas operations throughout their history are comparable to those suffered by Russia during the Battle of Stalingrad alone…

It’s understandable that the ratio of human losses is not the same between these two countries.

And then there’s NATO. NATO is an American-led alliance of all European countries. The Americans advise and coordinate this alliance, but it is primarily European troops who will have to defend one of their members in the event of a Russian attack.

The largest army is that of France with 205,000, followed by Germany with 184,000 and Italy with 170,000. If we add in all the European NATO troops (excluding Turkey and the USA), we arrive at a figure of around 1.4 million. So, in terms of soldiers, the forces present are roughly equivalent between Russia and the NATO member states.

The problem is that NATO soldiers have almost no experience of fire. British and French soldiers have fought in Mali, Afghanistan, etc., but the others have only carried out minor missions. What’s more, like the French soldiers, the NATO army has been used to fighting a much weaker, guerrilla enemy. We’re a long way from the pattern proposed in Ukraine, with mass warfare balanced between the two sides and a heavy dose of technology. So, I’m afraid that the value of European armies will not be the same against a Russian army that has a great deal of combat experience in Ukraine.

French soldier in Mali.

What’s more, the Russian army responds as one. They have a single leadership, a single General Staff, and can articulate and decide very quickly. The Europeans and NATO, on the other hand, respond to several armies from several countries, each with their own decision-making and alliance dynamics.

What’s more, three-quarters of European troops are west of Poland. In the event of Russian aggression, it would take several weeks to mobilize and transport troops to the front, giving Russia ample time to advance and take the Baltic states.

III. Conclusion.

We have a country that wants to regain its Soviet influence, with an economy ready to meet the army’s needs. An army that’s up and running and recruiting like crazy, and on the other side, a European army and economy that’s still in peacetime. I’m not giving the Baltic States and/or Poland much of a chance…

Through my demonstration, I’m trying to convince you that Russia will invade the Baltic States and/or Poland come what may, and that companies need to take immediate action to counter this risk.

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